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Abstract: When the popular initiative “against mass immigration” was accepted by the Swiss
people and cantons on 9 February 2014, Ticino had by far the highest approval rate. The Italian-
speaking canton thus once more confirmed its singular position, assumed since the 1990s, on
popular votes regarding immigration and foreign policy. This seems to be indicative of wider crises
and changes in both the economic and political spheres that have favoured the emergence of a
political opposition between centre and periphery. The results of a survey among 1400 citizens of
Ticino after the vote of 9 February confirm this. In essence, on top of the question of immigration,
the vote was influenced by a fearful perception of Ticino as a “double periphery” vis-a-vis both
Berne and Lombardy.
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The Swiss popular initiative “against mass immigration” (accepted on February 9, 2014)
is one of the most important votes on migration to take place in the last twenty years.
It is significant not only in terms of national relevance and the impact on foreign policy,
and in particular with regard to Swiss-EU relations, but also because of regional
implications. The highest support for the initiative was seen in Ticino (68.2% yes-votes,
compared to the national average of 50.3%), confirming once again this canton’s
singularity in referenda related to immigration and foreign policy. Ever since the 1990s,
but especially since the 2000s – as seen when voting, for example, on the bilateral
agreements with the EU or on the minaret initiative (see also Manatschal 2015) – Ticino
has voted in significant contrast to the national trend. Moreover, the voting behaviour
of Ticino over the last two decades also provides for a huge dissimilarity with respect to
the tendency of the 1970s and 1980s, when Ticino was recognised for expressing more
openness on questions to do with migrants and foreign issues, much like the French-
speaking cantons. For example, we observe the lowest support among all Swiss cantons
for the first popular initiative on €Uberfremdung (“excess of foreigners”) in 1970, and one
of the highest support ratios for the Swiss-European agreements of 1972. By contrast, it
was among the cantons most supportive of the fifth Schwarzenbach initiative on the
“limitation of immigration”, which was put to the vote in 1988, and among the least
sympathetic towards the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement in 1992 (Kn€usel
1994: 308-312). No other Swiss canton has shown a similar shift during the course of
the last forty years.
*The authors would like to thank Gian-Andrea Monsch for his support with the data analysis.
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Consequently, the question arises how to explain this singularity in federal referenda. In
our attempt to respond to it, we will take into account the economic and political
evolution and opinions provided by Ticino’s citizens. This contribution is organised into
three parts: first, we briefly discuss some theoretical perspectives; second, we develop
rationales and hypotheses arising from contextual knowledge and previous voting analyses
related to Ticino; and third, we highlight some crucial findings from an original cantonal
survey devoted to the popular initiative “against mass immigration” in Ticino.
Theoretical reflections
In trying to explain the voting behaviour in Swiss referenda of the last two decades
concerning migration and foreign policy, the dominant trend in the literature has been to
focus on the opposition between sovereignty and globalisation, between “conservatism”
and “openness” (e.g. Sardi and Widmer 1993; Christin et al. 2002). In this opposition, the
main aspects that come into play are the more or less strong attachment to the principles
of national independence and the idea of a Swiss “special case” being jeopardized by
European integration and immigration (Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Church 2004). Within
this perspective, there is also a regional focus, in which the analysis of the perception of
foreigners allows a distinction to be made: the French-speaking Swiss seem to have a
much more positive perception of French citizens than Swiss-Germans have of Germans
(Widmer and Buri 1992; Theiler 2004: 646-650). Moreover, the role of the Swiss People’s
Party (UDC/SVP) is often mentioned in this perspective because of the leading role it has
played and the strategy it has adopted during several referenda related to these issues.
Although this opposition also seems to play a crucial role in Ticino, we might ask if this is
enough to explain its enduring orientation, which it expresses with a unique strength. Over
the last two decades, the greatest differences between Ticino’s results and the national
average occurred in the referenda on the first bilateral agreements in May 2000 (24.2%),
on the extension of the agreement on the free movement of persons to new EU countries
in 2005 (19.9%), and on the initiative against mass immigration in 2014 (17.9%). These
outcomes mark clear dissimilarities with respect to both the French- and German-speaking
cantons. At the same time, the Swiss People’s Party is much weaker in Ticino than it is in
other cantons, having gathered only around 6% of the vote in the last national elections
of 2011 (national average: 26.6%).
One can consider a second perspective in the literature on voting behaviour, namely one
concerning rural-urban opposition (Bolliger 2007). However, as political geographers have
pointed out, in recent decades Ticino underwent one of the most radical and intense
urbanisation processes of any of the Swiss cantons (Schuler 2009: 130). Moreover,
ecological analyses of the voting behaviour in the referendum arena tend to confirm a low
salience of rural-urban opposition within this canton (Mazzoleni 2011). Also, in many votes
Lugano, the main city of Ticino, clearly appears as an outlier among Swiss cities, because it
votes strongly “conservative” in federal referenda (see Hermann & Leuthold 2003).
A third perspective, finally, is based on an opposition already extensively analysed in
comparative political science, namely that between centre and periphery. The latter has
only rarely been taken into account in the Swiss literature (however, see Sciarini 2002).
Within this theoretical perspective, we may classically consider the concept of
peripherality, which is based on the politicisation of remoteness, distinctiveness, and
dependence (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Moreover, we can assume that over the course of
recent decades, the loosening of state boundaries has challenged the meaning of the centre-
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periphery opposition, which “is no longer based on the dyadic relationship between the
state and the regional distinctive community” (Bartolini 2005: 256). Under globalisation
and Europeanization, the framing of the centre-periphery relationship is seen as a political
response by structurally weak territories confronting the decline of the national-integrated
model established by Keynesian national policies, the weakening of national border
control, and higher economic competition among territories. In this sense, the defence of
regional interests includes not only self-determination and identity, but also socio-
economic claims (Hepburn 2009). In our theoretical framework, then, the politicisation of
peripherality supposes a) structural components, b) a framing discourse by political actors,
and c) behaviour and attitudes expressed by citizens that we define as attitudes towards
territorial peripherality. In the case of Ticino, several structural and political aspects
suggest that this latter perspective can usefully contribute to highlighting the recent voting
trend in federal referenda on migration and foreign policy issues.
Troubling a “victorious” periphery
Although the canton of Ticino in many ways represents an example of a “victorious” region
in the European landscape of the twentieth century (Rokkan 1999: 185ff.), a multi-
dimensional crisis – involving socio-economic, identity and political aspects – provides a
turning point for Ticino at the beginning of the 1990s. First of all, the most severe economic
crisis since the 1930s erupted in the canton. This crisis meant, for the first time in decades,
the reappearance of a widespread experience of unemployment for Swiss residents (that is,
for voters) in Ticino. To an even greater extent than its socio-economic import, this crisis
also had identity implications, since it was accompanied by fears of a decline in the
exceptional sense of well-being that the canton had achieved in the period between the 1950s
and the 1970s, which had brought an end to a centenary legacy of poverty and emigration.
The economic crisis of the early 1990s and its persistence is particularly significant regarding
the peripheral status of Ticino among Swiss cantons as it ties in with its insularity, be that in
in terms of the economy (historically lower wages than the national average), language
(Ticino is the only Swiss canton where Italian – a minority language spoken by about 7% of
Swiss all over the country – is the exclusive official language), or geography (the Alpine
chain is a durable obstacle in the relations between Ticino and the rest of Switzerland).
Although World War II, the development of the welfare state in Switzerland since the 1940s,
and the “thirty glorious years” were able to consolidate the national integration of Ticino,
the new global trends embedded in the economic crisis of the 1990s have increased the
conditions for peripheral mobilisation by minority nationalisms (Keating and McGarry
2001), including those of borderland regions (Malloy 2010).
In recent decades, therefore, despite the federal system, the style of accommodation, and
the institutional recognition of minorities in Switzerland, Ticino seems to have undergone
a specific wave of politicisation in terms of the structural components of its peripherality.
The economic and cultural crisis of Ticino in the early 1990s overlaps with a significant
weakening of those cantonal political parties that traditionally channeled voting behaviour
in electoral and referendum arenas. After many decades with a particularly stable cantonal
party system (see Vatter 2014), the Christian Democratic Party (PDC/CVP) lost its second
seat in the cantonal government in 1987; electoral support for the Liberal Party (PLR/
FDP) has progressively eroded; and the left-wing parties have suffered from strong
divisions. It was in this context that a new protest party arose in 1991, the Lega dei
Ticinesi, challenging the cantonal party system and, at the same time, the Swiss
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government and parliament by denouncing them for the discriminatory stance they had
taken against Ticino – in the past and above all in the present.
In all the cantonal and federal elections since 1991, the Lega has provided several proofs
of its electoral achievement. Its apex was achieved with the cantonal elections of 2011,
when it became the first party in the cantonal government (with two seats out of five, and
about 29% of voter support), and the second in the cantonal parliament. It was especially
supported by unskilled workers and people fearing socio-economic uncertainty (Mazzoleni
et al. 2011). What has been crucial in the agenda of the Lega over the last 24 years is the
link between regional and national concerns, on the one hand, and between richness and
Swissness, on the other. Moreover, as an in-depth diachronic analysis of newspapers
(editorials, articles, letters to the editors and advertisements) has shown, the Lega was the
main political actor in the federal referendum arena, especially on immigration and foreign
policy issues, in the period from 1995 to 2005 (Mazzoleni et al. 2007: 43-44).
However, within the cantonal political system, the Lega does not have a monopoly on
centre-periphery claims in the 1990s and 2000s, as expectations towards Berne remained
elevated. Especially in the recent years the MPs of almost all the parties in Ticino have
submitted several legislative proposals to the federal parliament, including cantonal
initiatives. Complaints were heard about the scarcity of Italian-speaking civil servants in
the federal administration or among members of the boards of public enterprises (Post,
Swisscom, Federal Railways, etc.) and a failure to understand the railway workers’ strike
of 2008 in Bellinzona – which had exceptionally high support among the population of the
whole canton, but also within the cantonal government and political parties from the left
to the right – against plans to lay off the workers. We can also refer to the oft-repeated
demand, from all cantonal parties, for an Italian-speaking member of the Federal Council,
following the resignation of Flavio Cotti in 1999.
The consolidation of centre-periphery claims corresponds to the period comprising the
adoption of the agreement with the EU on the free movement of persons in 2002 and the
rising number of controversies between Switzerland and Italy in 2008, involving bank
account secrecy, the role of the financial place of Lugano, and cross-border workers.
Although the concern of cross-border workers also occurs in other parts of Switzerland
(Helbling 2011), the politicisation of this issue in Ticino became particularly strong in
linking with centre-periphery opposition. A new framing has developed around a “double
periphery”: the weakening of national borders would increase Ticino’s peripherality with
respect to the richer Swiss cantons, but also with regard to northern Italy. The growing
presence of cross-border workers and persistent socio-economic difficulties in Ticino
permit the joining together of claims against both Berne and Italy, Ticino’s neighbour and
founding member of the EU. This framing emphasises the negative impact of border
permeability that increases pressure from the South, since the region of Lombardy (with
about 10 million residents) has a higher unemployment rate and lower wages than Ticino
(a canton with 350,000 inhabitants). The message is this: an increase in national border
permeability means a decrease in Swiss well-being, in particular for Ticino. In the 2000s,
the Lega, but also increasingly the centre and right-wing cantonal parties (and, last but
not least, the Greens), stressed that increased economic competition enhanced by
European integration would represent an authentic risk for regional well-being.
Consequently, in the case of Ticino, with respect to federal referenda on migration and
foreign policy issues, the question arises to what extent the national vs. international
scheme has to be completed by a centre-periphery frame that informs citizens’ attitudes
towards peripherality. Empirical evidence shows that this question is far from
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unreasonable, as indicated in the case of the 2005 referendum on the extension of the free
movement of persons to the new EU countries, on which a post-referendum survey was
carried out among 1,300 Swiss citizens residing in Ticino (Mazzoleni et al. 2007: 113-137).
According to this survey, multivariate analyses underline the influence of attitudes
regarding foreigners and Swiss neutrality and, above all, the role of trust towards the EU.
But what is more – controlling for, among others, age, sex, educational skills, and the
perception of economic conditions and political interest – the analysis also shows that the
perception of Ticino’s relations with Berne and Northern Italy (especially Lombardy), in
terms of risks and opportunities, equally exerts a highly relevant impact (Mazzoleni et al.
2007: 134–135).
Attitudes towards peripherality
More recently, based on a post-vote survey among more than 1,400 citizens,1 an analysis
of attitudes and behaviour on the occasion of the vote on the popular initiative “against
mass immigration” in Ticino confirms the impact of the opposition between “national
sovereignty” and “international openness”, but also – and at the same time – that of the
centre-periphery dimension (Pilotti and Mazzoleni 2014). Let us now present these findings
in more detail.
First of all, the survey allows for answers to an open question about subjective
motivations when voting on the initiative “against mass immigration”. Thus, 29.8% of all
answers emphasise the “need to regulate immigration that is out of control”, while 42%
mention an economic motivation related to the regional labour market. More particularly,
21.3% denounce that “too many cross-border workers create unemployment, illicit
competition in the labour market and traffic jams”; 11.1% want priority to be given to
Swiss and Ticino citizens in the labour market; and 10.3% point to declining income and
rising unemployment, highlighting the link between feelings of (in)tolerance toward
immigrants and the fear of losing economic wealth (see also Freitag and Rapp 2013).
Finally, 11.4% wanted to send a message to the political authorities as “unheard
citizens”. In contrast, 20.1% of opponents declare themselves to be aware of the
“problems” but claim the initiative is inadequate; 19.6% argue the initiative is “too
extreme”; and 14.1% regard immigrants as an opportunity for Switzerland (for more
details, see Pilotti and Mazzoleni 2014: 40). These answers to the open question suggest
that immigration is the dominant aspect for the initiative’s supporters, but also that there
are other dimensions connected to the anti-establishment protest and the specific socio-
economic situation of Ticino as a borderland and periphery. More particularly, it is
difficult to disarticulate issues related to the national scale from those concerning the
regional scale.
In an attempt to show the impact of specific regional issues, our perspective proceeds to
highlight attitudes towards peripherality with a set of items and their link to voting
behaviour.2 Table 1 shows that the initiative’s supporters explicitly refer to Ticino as a
“special case” claiming support from the Swiss Confederation. A very high proportion of
those who fully agree that “Switzerland should do more for the Canton of Ticino” and
“the Canton of Ticino has a greater need to defend itself from foreign competition than
1 This survey was carried out between 9 February and 3 March 2014.
2 With regards to the difficulties inherent in measurement equivalence among subnational groups, including
Switzerland (Sarrasin et al. 2013), we prefer to adopt a closely context-dependent set of items.
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other Swiss regions” supported the initiative (79.4% and 80.3%, respectively). The
proportion of supporters markedly decreases among those (few) who do not agree with
these statements (39.5% and 44.4%, respectively). Unexpectedly, our indicator of cantonal
“entrepreneurship” seems not to exert direct influence on the voting behaviour. The
relationship between voting behaviour and the statement “Ticino must achieve more by
itself and rely less on support from the Confederation” appears marginal.
Table 2 adds three other indicators of peripherality. Those who supported the initiative
believe almost unanimously that tighter relations with the European Union threatens the
identity of Ticino (93.3%), while on the other side, the proportion of the initiative’s
supporters strongly decreases among those who agree only a little or not at all with this
assertion (32.4%). Moreover, supporters are opposed to a greater economic integration of
Ticino with Lombardy (89.5%) and to a strengthening of relations with Italy (86.7%).
Conversely, a majority of those who oppose the initiative “against mass immigration”
agree very much with the assertions that “the Canton of Ticino has to take advantage of
an economic integration with Lombardy” (58.4%) and that, “as a linguistic minority,
Ticino has everything to gain in strengthening its relations with Italy” (60.6%).
These indicators tend to show that the dual relationship, with Berne on the one hand
and with Italy (and especially Lombardy) on the other, has had an influence on voting in
the initiative “against mass immigration”. Feelings of discrimination (“the Canton of
Ticino has a greater need to defend itself from foreign competition than other Swiss
regions”); fears of Europeanization (“Tighter relations with the European Union will
threaten the identity of Ticino”) and economic trans-border integration (“Ticino has to
Table 1: Vote on the initiative “against mass immigration” and attitudes on peripherality (part 1) in
Ticino, in %1
Yes No Total N p-Chi22 Cramer’s V
Switzerland should do more for Ticino *** 0,309***
Strongly disagree 39.5 60.5 100.0 38
Somewhat agree 50.6 49.4 100.0 342
Strongly agree 79.4 20.6 100.0 778
Total 69.6 30.4 100.0 1158
Ticino has a greater need to defend itself against
foreign competition than other Swiss regions
*** 0,289***
Strongly disagree 44.4 55.6 100.0 99
Somewhat agree 55.9 44.1 100.0 329
Strongly agree 80.3 19.7 100.0 692
I don’t know/NR 61.4 38.6 100.0 57
Total 69.6 30.4 100.0 1177
Ticino must achieve more by itself and rely
less on support from the Swiss Confederation
* 0,087*
Strongly disagree 78.6 21.4 100.0 206
Somewhat agree 67.7 32.3 100.0 502
Strongly agree 69.5 30.5 100.0 419
Total 70.4 29.6 100.0 1127
1 “I don’t know/no response” is shown only if the percentage is higher than 5%.
2 n.s. = not significant; *=p < 0.05; **=p < 0.01; ***=p < 0.001.
Source: Research Observatory for Regional Politics, University of Lausanne (Ovpr-Unil), 2014.
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take advantage of economic integration with Lombardy”); plus claims for national
protection (“Switzerland should do more for Ticino”) appear to be strongly related to
each other3 and to the vote itself.
Next, helped by multivariate models (logistic regression), we ask whether – beyond some
other factors such as issues of immigration and those related to political authorities
(strongly linked to the motivations mentioned by the respondents in the open question) –
there is a specific impact of attitudes towards peripherality. In preliminary models (see
Table 3), we can observe the impact of socio-professional variables, political trust (towards
the federal government, the EU, and Ticino politicians), and aspects related to the
perception of immigrants’ presence in Switzerland, in general, as well as immigrants’
impact on the economic well-being on a national scale, in particular.4 As expected, the
analysis shows a contrast between the national and European scale, on the one hand, and
Ticino, on the other: lower trust in the federal government and the European Union
increases the probability of support for the initiative. Inversely, it is higher trust in the
Table 2: Vote for the initiative “against mass immigration” and attitudes on peripherality (part 2) in
Ticino, in %1
Yes No Total N p-Chi22 Cramer’s V
Ticino has to take advantage of
economic integration with Lombardy
*** 0,353***
Strongly disagree 89.5 10.5 100.0 334
Somewhat agree 70.1 29.9 100.0 532
Strongly agree 41.6 58.4 100.0 214
I don’t know/NR 61.2 38.8 100.0 85
Total 69.8 30.2 100.0 1165
As a linguistic minority, Ticino has everything
to gain in strengthening its relations with Italy
*** 0,334***
Strongly disagree 86.7 13.3 100.0 392
Somewhat agree 67.6 32.4 100.0 578
Strongly agree 39.4 60.6 100.0 160
Total 70.3 29.7 100.0 1130
Tighter relations with the European Union
will threaten the identity of Ticino
*** 0,512***
Strongly disagree 32.4 67.6 100.0 281
Somewhat agree 71.9 28.1 100.0 431
Strongly agree 93.3 6.7 100.0 402
Total 69.7 30.3 100.0 1114
1 “I don’t know/no response” is shown only if the percentage is higher than 5%.
2 n.s. = not significant; *=p < 0.05; **=p < 0.01; ***=p < 0.001.
Source: Research Observatory for Regional Politics, University of Lausanne (Ovpr-Unil), 2014.
3 For instance, “Switzerland should do more for Ticino” is strongly correlated with “Tighter relations with the
European Union will threaten the identity of Ticino” (0.385*** Cramer’s V) and “Ticino has to take advantage
of economic integration with Lombardy” (0.293*** Cramer’s V).
4 Two items are considered. We ask the respondents if they agree more or less (on a 7-point scale) with the
statements “In Switzerland, there are too many immigrants” and “Swiss well-being is also dependent on the
contribution of foreigners”. With these two items, and with the question of trust in the EU, we also capture the
opposition between “conservatism” and “openness”.
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politicians of Ticino that tends to be positively related to supporting the initiative. This
result seems to introduce an explicit political component into the attitudes towards
peripherality, giving a specific position to the cantonal political elites.
Finally, in the last multivariate models we add a synthesis of items related to
peripherality through two components provided by an exploratory factor analysis, one
related to the Italian component (Italy and Lombardy), the other to Berne and its
‘open’ foreign policy (feelings of discrimination by comparison to other regions and
national protection), whilst the link with the EU overlaps the two components.5 Our
indicator of “cantonal entrepreneurship” (“Ticino must achieve more by itself and rely
less on support from the Confederation”) is only very weakly correlated with the other
variables and for this reason excluded from the factor analysis, contrasting with the
outcome of the analysis of 2005 (Mazzoleni et al. 2007: 132) in which cantonal
“entrepreneurship” was significantly correlated to the indicators of closeness to Italy
and Lombardy.
However, as this last multivariate model confirms, all else being equal, both components
of the attitudes towards peripherality significantly explain the probability of supporting or
opposing the initiative on 9 February 2014. Relevant are, on the one hand, the different
perceptions of Ticino as a vulnerable periphery needing federal protection. On the other
hand, there is also a different judgement concerning the importance for the Italian-
speaking canton to have a proactive attitude and to be dynamic vis-a-vis Italy, in general,
and Lombardy, in particular.
Conclusions
Our exploration devoted to the enduring orientation of Canton of Ticino with regard to
immigration and foreign-policy issues over the last 25 years has tried to explain this not
only as an opposition between national “conservatism” and international “openness”, but
also in terms of centre-periphery opposition. Socio-economic and cultural crises as well as
political changes have favoured the emergence of this phenomenon in Ticino ever since the
beginning of the 1990s, expressed in turn through a new mobilisation within this canton
thanks to the presence and success of a regionalist party, the Lega dei Ticinesi. In the
2000s, the impact of processes related to Europeanisation and globalisation further
enhanced the relevance of centre-periphery politicisation in Ticino, reinforcing and
enlarging the “national” centre-periphery claim with a trans-border and transnational
centre-periphery protest with regards to increasing and durable fiscal controversies between
Switzerland (Ticino) and Italy.
In this configuration, federal referenda on immigration and foreign policy have become
channels in which these claims can be expressed. Territorially bounded attitudes not only
entail feelings against foreign policy openness and immigration in general, but also assume
meanings related to centre-periphery opposition. A first cantonal survey carried out in
2005 about the extension of the agreement on the free movement of persons with the EU
confirmed the impact of attitudes of peripherality on voting behaviour in Ticino. A second
cantonal survey, focused once again on Ticino but this time regarding the initiative
“against mass immigration” voted and accepted on 9 February 2014, equally confirms, as
we have highlighted in this contribution, the impact of attitudes of peripherality, towards
5 Two factors are provided by an exploratory maximum-likelihood factor analysis with seven variables presented
in tables 1 and 2 (rotation varimax, 44.5% variation explained).
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both Berne and Italy. As we have also shown, support for the initiative of 9 February is
far from being an anti-establishment protest, but instead entails trust in regional
politicians.
Of course, this does not mean that all federal referenda devoted to immigration and
foreign policy must show this result, but a perspective based on centre-periphery
opposition may also be crucial for understanding many other mobilisations in which
Ticino represents an outlier from national trends. At the same time, this perspective might
not only be helpful to explain – at least partially – voting behaviour in the case of Ticino.
In Switzerland, too, the acceleration of the European integration process seems to
coincide, on the one hand, with deep socio-economic changes and, on the other, with a
redefinition of centre-periphery relations. In the case of Ticino, important consequences of
these evolutions are durable centre-periphery party mobilisations and enduring
predispositions in federal referenda. In any case, it would be useful to consider more
carefully the impact of the context-dependent implications of the “conservation” vs.
“openness” opposition in all parts of Switzerland, since these may vary between regions
and cantons.
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